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Neil MacCormick* Justice: An Un-original
Position
Human societies are not voluntary associations. At least so far as
concerns national societies and states, most human beings do not
have a choice to which one they will belong, nor what shall be the
law and the constitition of that to which they do belong; especially,
their belonging to a given state is not conditional upon their
assenting to the basic structure of its organization. Someone who is
born into a given state has obviously no choice, no opportunity to
stipulate conditions upon which he will accept citizenship. Choice
can perhaps be exercised later, when one is an adult, when one may
find oneself free to depart from one's native state and to take up
residence elsewhere with a view to naturalization as a citizen of the
state of one's choice. But in that latter situation one is in a weak
position to set conditions for one's joining the chosen society. One
accepts the constitution and the laws as they are, or one does not
acquire citizenship. What is more, somebody who is thinking of
changing his citizenship has an appreciably more restricted range of
models open to him than someone thinking of changing his car; and
by contrast with that situation, he does not have the option of going
without if none appeals to him.
That human societies are not voluntary associations is a quite
general truth, embracing the most libertarian of democracies and the
most oppressive of autocracies, though of course there are marked
and significant differences as to the degree to which in the former
the individual citizen has the opportunity of securing that account is
taken of his wishes and desires in the framing of laws, from the
highest reaches of constitutional law to the lowest trivialities of
parking regulations. Nobody's original citizenship is acquired by
choice; subsequent changes of citizenship are open only to a
minority, and even those who might change but deliberately choose
not to do so may be moved by considerations other than a conviction
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that their present national society is, or can practically be made to
be, a perfectly constituted and wholly ideal form of human
community.
Men are not born free; yet they are not everywhere wholly in
chains; and thus a capital question for the philosophy of law in its
critical, if not its analytical, modes, is that of attempting to settle
what are the forms of social organization which deserve approval as
just and well-fitted to the human condition and the human situation.
To answer the question is to advance a theory of justice.
One approach to answering that question, an approach which is
not without a certain obvious attractiveness, an approach which the
work of John Rawls' has made important for contemporary thought,
is to set up a counterfactual hypothesis, to imagine a situation quite
different from that which actually obtains anywhere. The
supposition is that we should conceive of a situation in which a
society is to be formed by free and mutually independent
individuals, as equal in rank, in propertylessness, in status and
power as men belonging to no organized society must be, yet not
ignorant of the advantages which social collaboration may bring
upon beings who find themselves in a world with a sufficiency yet
no superabundance of natural resources, their physical and mental
capabilities being similar though subject to variation, and their
collective being vastly greater than their individual ingenuity,
resourcefulness and strength. Entertaining that supposition, we then
ask: "To what form of coercive social organization would these
people in that 'original position' 2 assent?" The answer which we
give may then be taken as a blueprint, as a critical scheme for the
appraisal of our existing involuntary societies, as a pattern for the
amendment of our actual states and their laws so that they shall be
worthy of the universal and voluntary assent of citizens equal in
freedom and equal in human dignity; worthy of such assent from all,
even though actual assent may not be always given at all times by all
citizens, blinded as they may from time to time be by greed,
passion, or self interest.
It is not difficult to conceive of objections to that way of tackling
the problem. Suppose that two thirds of the group who come
together have white skins and one third have black skins. May the
larger group not agree to a form of society permanently
1. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1971) [hereinafter cited as "T.J.
2. Rawls's expression; see T.J. at 17-22.
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disadvantageous to the. minority? Suppose that there are equal
numbers of men and of women, but the men know themselves to be
collectively greater in physical strength, as they believe themselves
to be in intellectual prowess, than the women. May they not set up a
society which permanently favours their interests the more? (Do not
our actual societies sadly show forth the intrinsic probability of
that?) Suppose that a small group of the most intelligent and
articulate succeed in prevailing upon the rest to accept a system
which will confer excessive advantages on intelligent and articulate
people. It is at least highly questionable whether societies having
such characteristics could be approved as just, though there is
concrete evidence that they might be viable.
That objection is not, however, conclusive. There are' two
conditions upon which it might be met: first, demand complete
unanimity, 3 not mere majority agreement. But that will not be
sufficient to prevent the clever from tricking the less clever into
unanimous acceptance of a plan disadvantageous to themselves, and
small minorities - Celts, perhaps, for the sake of argument - may
be sufficiently aware of the advantages of social collaboration to
accept a compromise under which they are relatively disadvantaged
as a group rather than excluded altogether. Unanimity being
therefore insufficient in itself, we must add the second: let us
postulate that the parties in this "original position" are in fact
unaware of their own specific characteristics - colour, race, sex,
religious or political convictions, degree of intelligence and
physical strength and so on. They know that they are human beings
to whom such characteristics belong, but not what particular
characteristics they themselves have, nor in what measure.
At the risk of having moved from an imaginary but imaginable to
a fantastic and unimaginable situation, we have met the objection.
People forming a society behind a "veil of ignorance '" 4 as to their
own characteristics as individuals would not know how to favour
themselves unfairly at the expense of others. To agree to a system
which allowed for wide variations in fortune or social position and
power would be to take a great gamble. One might be lucky, and
find oneself very well off, or unlucky and find oneself very badly
off. Perhaps people might in those circumstances prefer to settle for
3. As Rawls does; see T.J. at 122ff., 139ff.
4. Rawls's expression again; the idea behind it is as summarized here; see T.J. at
12, 18-19, 136-142.
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some system which allows for only small differentials in wealth and
power - or for none?
But again, it could be suggested that the risk is not so enormous.
For once the society has been formed as agreed, we move out from
behind our "veil of ignorance", and can we not then change matters
if it turns out that we have agreed to something horribly
disadvantageous to ourselves? Once I find that I have the advantage
of being of the male sex, can I not get together with other men
equally safe in the same knowledge and subject women to
conditions which would have been unacceptable to me when I did
not know to which sex I belonged?
If we allow that, we are back to the old objection that whatever
our imagined convention might secure in the way of viability of
social arrangements, it will not necessarily secure justice - not if
we let people change the rules as agreed once we let them out from
behind the "veil of ignorance". There is a simple answer to that.
We are the masters of our own experiment, so we can simply
stipulate that there is to be no such changing of the rules, not for the
purposes of this experiment. Let it be recalled that the object of the
experiment is to find what would be the ordering of a just society, in
which case it is quite irrelevant that some men may wilfully depart
from justice in bending their own societies to their own advantage.
Indeed, that is the very fact which makes it necessary to formulate
principles of justice on which to base a permanent and vigilant
criticism of the actual practices and institutions of our own
societies. Let us therefore stipulate that the parties in the "original
position" are to frame fundamental principles for the organization
of their society on the footing that they commit themselves to them
unanimously and in perpetuity, subject to no amendment once the
"veil of ignorance" is removed and an actual society formed. 5 Let
these principles be universal in their application and eminently
general in their terms, and let it be supposed that there can be no
going back on them.
What then would be the relevance of such experimentally, or, to
speak more truly, hypothetically derived principles for the actual
concrete societies in which we live, which as has been said are by
no means voluntary associations formed by agreement among free
and equal human beings each unbiassed by considerations of his or
her own individual or class advantage? The argument which we
5. See T.J. at 136-142.
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have to confront is the argument that principles so derived would be
principles definitive of a conception of justice worthy of the assent
of all human beings as free and rational moral agents, and consistent
with the mutual repsect for each other's persons which is incumbent
upon such beings. If I do not do him an injustice, the argument as I
have sketched it here is in its essentials precisely the argument
advanced by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. It is an argument
which he rightly acknowledges to be similar in its premises to
arguments of Kant and Rousseau, before whom it was prefigured in
rather different form in the work of Locke, of Hobbes, of Grotius
and of others.
Before turning to assess the argument and its fruits, I must
re-emphasize the hypothetical character of the social contract
envisaged. Here there is no theory as to the origins of civil society,
nor any assertion of political obligation founded upon some contract
supposed to have been framed in the past among the founders of a
society. The argument is not explanatory nor historical; it is critical
and hypothetical. Its conclusions purport to show not how any society
was formed but how every society might be reformed. "Justice is the
first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of thought".
6
Justice requires that like advantages and disadvantages
accrue to all who find themselves in like circumstances, and that as
between those who are in different circumstances there should be no
arbitrary differences in the advantages and disadvantages afforded
and allotted by society. But that formal concept requires to be filled
out with a substantive conception 7 of justice telling us what are to
constitute like circumstances, and when inequalities are to be
rejected as arbitrary. To frame such a conception is to formulate
principles, critical principles for evaluating and justifying or
rejecting the legal and economic frameworks and practices of
concrete states and societies. Can we, as Rawls and his lineal
ancestors claim, expound such principles convincingly in any
possible form?
There was one crucial point in the argument in the form in which
I put it (whether or not that correctly represents Rawls's own
argument need not detain us if the argument is of interest in its own
right), a point which almost seemed to reduce the hypothetical
6. T.J. at 3.
7. For this useful distinction of terminology as between "the concept" of justice
and particular "conceptions" ofjustice, see T.J. at 5-6.
372 The Dalhousie Law Journal
contract from the realm of the imaginary to the realm of the
fantastic, and that point needs further consideration. That was the
point at which we considered the possibility of an unfair agreement
being made, for example in the interests of men as against women,
to exclude which possibility I introduced, using Rawls's words, the
idea of a "veil of ignorance" to meet the objection. But even if this is
not held to be merely fantastical, does it not involve a fundamental
logical fallacy: that of petitio principii? The only reason for
modifying the "original position" in this way by introducing the
"veil of ignorance" is that otherwise the principles derived from the
hypothetical contract may allow for, or even foster, obvious
unfairness, whether it be in favour of white people over black
people, men over women, clever over stupid, strong over weak,
healthy over sick, or (in each case) vice versa. So it is to obviate
obvious unfairness, not on any ground of intrinsic plausibility (far
from it) that we introduce the idea of people making a contract to
form a society on the basis of total ignorance (experimentally
postulated) of their own individual characteristics. Are we not then
simply assuming what we set out to prove, namely what constitutes
obvious unfairness? If the contractarian argument is implausible
without the "veil of ignorance", and question begging with it, what is
its worth? We may observe, further, that precisely the same reason
justified introducing the stipulation that the agreement must be
conceived as yielding general principles of universal application
whose acceptance is to be binding in perpetuity. So precisely the
same logical criticism may be made of this as of the preceding
stipulation.
There is, however, a simple answer to this criticism. It is
certainly true that the use of the hypothetical contract must
presuppose certain views upon justice. Let me take, for instance,
the view that just decisions are dependent upon the impartiality of
the decision maker. I am not likely to be a fair judge of the question
whether I am the best qualified candidate for a job which I wish to
obtain in competition with other people: even less am I likely to be
thought so by the other candidates if perchance I should in fact be
entrusted with deciding on the appointment. What is needed is
somebody who can assess and evaluate the qualifications of each of
the competing candidates solely by reference to criteria relevant to
the job itself, and who can assess them impartially without favour
to any of the candidates based on any grounds other than the criteria
provided by the job-description and the functions to be performed
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by the person appointed. We may observe that this is a formal
requirement understandable by reference to the formal concept of
justice, that like cases must be treated alike and any arbitrary
differences of treatment rejected, which in turn entails that decisions
must be made only in accordance with principles conceived to be of
universal application.
I know of no way in which someone who accepts the value of
impartiality in decision-making can demonstrate to somebody who
rejects it that he is mistaken and ought to change his opinion.
Thrasymachus may always remain unmoved by the eloquence and
argumentative skill of Socrates. The argument to which I am always
driven back is that of Hume,8 or something like it: if I contemplate
the condition of a society in which the principle of impartiality is
observed by contrast with one in which it is not, I cannot myself say
other than that the former is one which is infinitely more appealing
to me, and must be so to anyone whose frame of mind is anything
like mine. But that argument falls a long way short of being
logically compelling, and it may not even be very persuasive in
terms of psychology for all I know. To say that somebody who
rejects it has no idea of justice is obviously appealing - but has all
the appearance of an attempt to use a stipulative definition to silence
an opponent, and why should my opponent accept my definition
anymore than the argument whose inconclusiveness led me to assert
it?
Be that as it may, even if the value of impartiality is not
conclusively demonstrable, it is widely accepted, and there is
therefore real value in asking what follows from accepting it;
especially is it valuable if we wish to transcend particular examples
like that of selection of one out of competing candidates for an
attractive job and to proceed to more general and momentous
questions about the good and just ordering of societies. If I have
understood him correctly, Rawls, in suggesting the use of a
hypothetical social contract formed by individuals behind a "veil of
ignorance" as a method of formulating principles of justice, is
aiming to do no more and no less than to provide a way of working
out the requirements which follow from acceptance of such a
requirement as that of impartiality. So he does not beg the question.
He does not assume the value of impartiality in order to prove it. He
8. Expressed with particular clarity in the Enquiries Concerning the Human
Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1966).
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assumes the value of impartiality and then uses the device of the
hypothetical contract in order to test out its implications in the
context of an attempt to frame principles for the framing or the
criticism of laws and other social and economic institutions. His
argument plainly cannot then show us that (or whether) we ought to
be impartial; what it can perhaps do is show to what a belief in
impartiality would commit us if we really took it seriously in
relation to the basic constitution and organization of our societies.
I think it is a correct reading of his work to say that Rawls intends
no more than that - Rawls does at one point expressly state that the
hypothetical contract is simply an argumentative tool which can be
used to "make vivid" 9 what are the implications of the constraints,
e.g. concerning impartiality, which are commonly accepted in
arguments about justice in practical contexts. But whether or not it
is correct to impute that view to Rawls, it seems clear from the
present argument that the use of a hypothetical social contract as
Rawls uses it to elaborate a theory of justice cannot but depend upon
presuppositions, including presuppositions about basic require-
ments of justice, which are not themselves derivable from (because
they are logically prior to) the contractarian argument.
Indeed it can well be said, and has been said, that an obvious
truth about any contractarian argument is that one can only get out
of it the logical consequences of what one has initially put into it 10
in stipulating the circumstances and characteristics of the parties
envisaged as making the initial compact to form an entirely new
society. The idea, put in broad and crude terms is something like
this: a social arrangement would be just if all the parties affected by
it have the opportunity of participating in the design of the
arrangement, but only if each is impartial in weighing his own
interests and the interests of others, and only if some sub groups do
not gang up to further their own interest at the expense of the others.
Each person, having interests of his own to secure and to pursue,
must be given an opportunity to secure and pursue them to the
extent that is fair, given the interests which others wish to secure
and to pursue, and the one way to settle the problem of fairness and
balance is to try to find out a system which all could agree to if each
gave due weight to the interest of others. Since, for a variety of
9. See T.J. at 18.
10. This point is essentially derived from B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) at 22.
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reasons, actual societies have not been and could not be established
by such a procedure, we have to resort to intellectual experimenta-
tion to find out what would result in ideal conditions from such a
negotiation, and by appropriately designing a hypothetical model
we can find out what would be the result, writing in such notions as
that of the "veil of ignorance" as a proxy for the principle of
impartiality. But already we have written in the notion that what is
crucial to a just ordering of society is that each person should be free
to pursue whatever interests he has, of whatever kind, subject only
to constraints agreement to which is required in order that every
other person should be free to pursue whatever interests he has,
subject only to the like constraint. The use of the model in effect
writes this into the initial programme, and must again be reflected in
the result - there can here be no discrimination between different
objects of human interest in terms of their intrinsic worth11 ; nor can
there be any allowance for notions such as the Marxist one of false
consciousness in terms of which people may mistake their real
interests and pursue false ends by reason of such a mistake. What
we are in effect writing in is the classical liberal presumption that
people are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and ought
always to be treated as being such.
What is more, because the model postulates hypothetical people
making an agreement in circumstances (including the "veil of
ignorance") in which no actual human beings can ever be placed,
we have to decide what characteristics they are to be deemed as
having in order that we may calculate what principles they would
choose as the basic principles of social organization. Not merely do
we in effect write in certain basic principles such as that of
impartiality; we must also ascribe to them general characteristics -
such as that of having interests which they desire to pursue, and
knowing what their own interests are. We have to ascribe to them
some degree of knowledge of the general facts of human nature and
the human situation as revealed to us by the natural and social
sciences - subject to all the imperfections and controversies of and
over contemporary knowledge in those fields. Only by ascribing to
them some such knowledge will we be able to reach any conclusions
at all as to the agreement our hypothetical people will reach; but to
ascribe to them any particular knowledge is to take some position on
contentious questions, and the position one takes will in turn, and
II. Cf. Barry, supra, note 10 at 20-26.
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necessarily, contribute to the result one obtains from the
experiment. Not merely must one ascribe to one's hypothetical
co-contractors knowledge about the world and the place within it of
men as social animals, one must have some view on matters of
motivation, and must ascribe some motivational attitudes to the
parties - for example, attitudes to taking risks.
Here I touch upon a theme which has been much elaborated by
critics of Rawls's work. Among the results which Rawls derives
from his own hypothesized contract is that people in the "original
position" would of necessity accept that there must be the most
complete freedom of religious, moral and political belief and
practice as is consistent with each having equal freedom in these
matters. His reasoning is that people who know what it is to have,
e.g. religious convictions, but who do not know what religious
convictions they themselves have (because of the "veil of
ignorance") would necessarily insist upon a principle of religious
freedom and tolerance rather than accept any principle as to the
establishment of a single official religion. They would do so
because they would be unwilling to risk finding themselves in a
persecuted minority if it turned out that their religious group was a
minority in the society to which they actually belonged.
Rawls's conclusion that religious tolerance is a requirement of
justice is one to which I personally am happy to assent. But what is
obvious is that its deduction from the hypothetical contract is
entirely dependent on the characteristics ascribed to the hypothetical
parties, for example on their attitude to gambling and risk-taking.
Ascription of different characteristics would result in different
conclusions - it is not inconceivable that we should so adjust the
hypothesis that the parties would prefer a principle of establishment
of religion under which those whose religious position happened in
fact to be orthodox should have the comfort and psychological
security of practising their faith in conditions in which dissent was
not tolerated while those who held dissenting faiths would have the
satisfaction of martyrdom in the cause of the faith held by them in
turn. For many who have held firm religious convictions those
alternatives have in fact proved more attractive than the liberalism
which Rawls deduces from his favoured premises. 12
12. On the matters discussed in this and the preceding paragraph, cf. Barry, supra,
note 10 at 121-24. See also N. MacCormick, Justice According to Rawls (1973),
89 L.Q. Rev. 393 at 408-12.
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As is obvious, this is a vein of argument which one could pursue
at very great length. But I think it has now been pursued far enough
to enable us to consider whether the resuscitation of the Kantian
idea of a hypothetical social contract is of any substantial value in
attempting to elucidate principles of social organization definitive of
an acceptable conception of social justice. 13 The most recent part of
the discussion may prompt the reflection that so far from elucidating
debate upon these difficult and fundamental questions, the effect
may rather be to obscure points of contention by concealing them
within the explicit or implicit premises established by the
characterization of the original position and the parties who find
themselves in that position and who seek to establish a society by
unanimous agreement.
For my own part, that is a criticism of Rawls's attempt to
establish his own principles of "justice as fairness" which in
reflecting upon A Theory of Justice over two years I have been
tempted to accept; but for the present at least I have come to reject
it. Despite accepting it as indubitably true that the principles derived
are entirely determined by the premises one establishes in choosing
how to set out the "original position", I find the Rawlsian
argumentative procedure an interesting one; indeed I find it so
precisely because that is the case. It provides a convenient method
for testing the implications of adhering to certain factual views
about the essential nature of human beings as social animals and to
certain broad principles of formal and procedural justice, together
with the ideal that human societies should be such that all their
members would be able willingly to consent to their organization as
free and rational moral agents. The implications of holding to
specified premises of that sort can be tested precisely by considering
the substantive principles which would be derived from them in the
negotiation of a hypothetical social contract. What is more, one can
use the procedure as a way of testing the rival merits of competing
social principles, by considering what variations in the premises
would lead to acceptance of one or another of rival principles. For
example, if utilitarianism is consistent with the possibility of very
considerable differentials in the matter of individual wealth or
power, one might find it necessary to impute to human beings a very
13. For criticism of the use of this form of argument, as distinct from the principles
derived from it, see D. D. Raphael, The Standard of Morals (Presidential Address
to the Aristotelian Society) PAS vol. XCVI (1974-75) at 1. Cf. Barry, supra, note
10, c. 11.
378 The Dalhousie Law Journal
great readiness to take the risk of extreme wealth or extreme
poverty, necessary, that is, in order to be able to derive acceptance
of the (or a) utilitarian principle from the negotiations in the
"original position". If ascription of such a characteristic is
implausible, to that extent doubt is cast upon the acceptability of
utilitarianism.
Yet is it really true that one's acceptance of a given conception of
justice is best tested by considering its derivability, and the possible
modes of its derivation, from some hypothetical contract? I cannot
believe that the answer to that question should be "Yes". The
ultimate test of any moral theory surely is critical evaluation of the
principles which it propounds as substantive principles of conduct,
whether principles of distributive justice, or principles relating to
some other sector of morality (I take it as true that questions of
justice do not exhaust the whole range of possible moral questions).
A set of principles of justice is in effect a sort of manual of
instructions for shaping the laws and institutions of society, and
competing conceptions of justice are thus in effect manuals whose
adoption will yield different laws and institutions, different forms of
society. By their fruits they shall be known. The ultimate tests by
which anyone can evaluate any conception of justice are, I should
submit, twofold: first, that of coherence and consistency - are the
principles self-consistent and free from contradictions or antinomies
internal to themselves, and are they in the sanie sense consistent
with the constellation of other principles to which I subscribe? -
and secondly, do I assent to the idea of my society's being reshaped
as the "manual" would require it to be reshaped? Would I so assent
whatever position I were assigned in that conceived society?
Of course, this too involves an effort of the imagination, to the
extent that one's attempt is to visualize the world as it would be if
the principles under consideration were put into effect. But the
world is such that more practical tests can take place, in so far as
there are processes for changing laws and institutions. To be
committed to a given conception of justice is to be committed to
trying to procure such change; to the extent that change occurs it can
be evaluated in concrete and not merely in abstract form. The
question shifts from the question "Would I accept this realized form
of society for myself and for all my fellow citizens, each of whose
humanity I am obliged to respect?" By my view of rationality,
rational commitment to any conception of justice requires such
continuous revaluation of one's principles to the extent that they are
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put into concrete effect. I do not believe in final blueprints, but
rather in a permanent effort to articulate the principles by which one
conceives oneself to be acting, and in a permanent disposition to
criticize them in the light of what results from putting them into
effect, and to amend principles and practice in the light of the
critique of their effects. 14 Therefore, while defending the value of
Rawls's argumentative procedure for some purposes, I nevertheless
say of it as of other forms of hypothetical reasoning that the ultimate
test is that of criticizing the results derived from it. If a legal model
were to be sought for that process, I would look not to the concept
of contract, but to the practice of critical reasoning characteristic of
the justification of legal decisions.
And so by a long road I come at last to the crucial point; to the
point of stating and considering the principles advanced by Rawls.
Here I shall confine myself to his "special conception" of justice,
which is an elaboration of a more general conception and which he
regards as being appropriate only to relatively developed societies,
in the economic sense.1 5 To state the governing principles of the
''special conception", they are as follows:
First Principle. Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all.' 6 (The basic liberties he lists as
including "political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for
public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty
of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along
with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of
law".)17
Second Principle. Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest advantage of the
least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b)
attached to offices and positions open to all under the conditions of
fair equality of opportunity. '8
These two principles are placed by Rawls in what he calls an
order of "lexical" priority' 9; by that he means that in any given
14. Barry puts a similar point: supra, note 10 at 121, and cf. R. M. Hare, Freedom
and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).




19. T. J. at 42-44; discussed in MacCormick, supra, note 12 at 414-5.
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situation the requirements of the first must be fully met before the
second comes into play - and, in a manner too complex to explain
here, a similar priority holds in relation to the internal elements of
the second. So, in any conflict between economic efficiency and a
claim of liberty justified by the first principle, such a claim of
liberty must prevail. Moreover, any increased economic advantage
to the worst off groups in society which would conflict with their
own, or others', liberty as defined under the first principle would be
ruled out even if it would otherwise fit in with the criteria posed in
the second principle.
The first principle, the principle of equal liberty, is subject to one
qualification not stated by Rawls in the summary which I quoted
above. For he states that in one circumstance a scheme of liberties
which distributes liberties unequally may be just. That circumstance
is if a grant of greater liberty to some group is acceptable to all those
who have the lesser liberty as a means of further securing their
scheme of liberties (liberty can be restricted only for the sake of
liberty). 2 A relevant case is perhaps presented by the immunities
and privileges, e.g. in relation to defamatory statements, enjoyed by
legislators in most democratic legislatures, at any rate so far as
concerns their utterances made in the deliberations of the
legislature.
When I apply my kind of test, I have no difficulty in accepting
this principle as proposed by Rawls, though of course it is very
vague and might give rise to much controversy as to its proper
application. I accept it if for no other reason than that continuing
critical revaluation of social principles requires the greatest possible
freedom. There is perhaps a potential criticism that liberty is a value
distinct from justice, and that the maximization of liberty, even if it
does not conflict with justice, is a policy distinct from the promotion
of justice, concerned as that is with the elimination of arbitrary
differentials between people. On the other hand, it might be argued
that everyone values liberty in some respects, though not each to the
same degree nor in the same respects as every other. Therefore any
system of laws and institutions which curtails liberty in other ways
than are essential to achieve a maximal overall scheme of liberty
will in fact bear harder on some than on others, in circumstances
where the sole difference is the activities which one rather than
another wishes to pursue freely. Thus, justice requires not merely
20. T.J. at 302.
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equality in respect of such liberty as is granted, but maximization of
the range of the total regime or constellation of liberties, as a
measure which practically secures equality between people with
differing tastes, interests and desires to pursue.
Some will say that in a society in which there are gross
inequalities, mere equality in formal legal liberties, so far from
being a requirement of justice, may merely be a mask for real
injustices. The poor and the rich alike are permitted to propagate
whatever views they wish through publication of newspapers under
a guarantee of freedom of the press - but it just so happens that the
poor cannot afford to run newspapers to propagate their views. That
is an opinion which seems to me to be eminently justified, and of
which Rawls takes account in terms of a distinction between the
existence of freedom and its worth21 to an individual upon whom
some formal freedom of action is conferred. On the ground that the
priority of liberty is defensible only when circumstances are such
that legal liberties have substantial worth to all citizens, he restricts
his "special conception of justice" to societies enjoying advanced
economies in which even the worst off are (or can be, given just
arrangements) relatively well off.
22
But that brings us to the question of the acceptability of the
second of Rawls's principles stated above. There is on the face of it
something odd about a principle of justice which appears to
advocate the existence of inequalities, as though the object were to
procure rather than to diminish social and economic inequalities. To
present it as a requirement of justice that "social and economic
inequalities are to be so arranged that they are to the greatest
advantage of the least advantaged" is at least to appear to be
primarily concerned with the advocacy of inequality. Far preferable
from this point of view is Rawls's statement of the "general
conception" from which the "special conception" is elaborated,
and which he states thus:
All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income
and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - all to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods
is to the advantage of the least favoured .23
What that more general formulation makes clear, is that the basic
21. T.J. at 204ff.
22. T. J. at 151-2; Barry makes rather heavy weather of this point in supra, note
10, c. 7.
23. T.J. at 62.
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idea is to secure equality as between all citizens, except where there
is some specific justifying reason for so organizing legal and social
institutions that inequalities may arise or exist within their
framework. What is more, it is clearly stated that there is to be one
and only one specific justifying reason for the toleration of
inequalities, namely that they maximize the well-being of the least
favoured under such arrangements. The Prime Minister of a state
has more power than his fellow citizens, but is this inequality of
power unjust?24 By Rawls's thesis, it is unjust unless it can be
shown that those who have less power, and especially those who
have the least power, are better off under a constitition which
confers that degree of power on a head of government than they
would be in any possible alternative arrangement. And that
argument goes in the same way for other forms of inequality, all of
which must be justifiable by that test or rejected as unjust. Thus in
economic matters, differences of individual income and wealth
must be restricted to that minimum which secures the existence of a
system which secures to the poorest members of a community a
standard of living better than could be achieved by any alternative
scheme of distribution, judged in the long-term.
All this is, as the "second principle" quoted makes clear, subject
of two qualifications. The first arises from the obligation of any
given generation to successor generations in the matter of
conservation of resources and investment for the future. One way to
make the present generation immediately better off is to give them
the seed-corn to eat, but the consequences of doing so are
catastrophic for successor generations. To cover this risk Rawls
advocates a just savings principle, under which investment is to be
pursued to the extent acceptable to the least fortunate of the present
generation in view of the advantages which it will confer on the
least fortunate of the next. That should be taken as meaning that no
generation has a right so to consume resources that their successors
are put in a worse position, and that each has a duty to make some
provision towards improving their successors' lot, the extent of the
duty being determined by the degree of "slack" which the poorest
of the present generation could be reasonably expected to allow for
their own children and grandchildren. 25
24. For a rather different illustrative example worked out at greater length, see
MacCormick, supra, note 12 at 401-2.
25. On "just savings" see T. J. at 284-293; contrary to Rawls's view, I see no
reason to think that justice in matters of conservation and investment is
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The second qualification is that concerning "fair equality of
opportunity". While inequalities are not unjust if they arise from
schemes which confer the greatest available advantage on the least
favoured, they become unjust if unequally favoured positions are
the closed preserve of a restricted group, class, caste or whatever
identified by criteria other than their specific fitness for the social
tasks to which the advantages in question accrue. The system must
make such positions open to all simply on the basis of talent, ability
and fitness for the job; and must do so in conditions of fairness to
all, which means that educational and other provision must be made
to secure that every person is given the best possible chance of
developing his or her talents, gifts and abilities to the full.
That gives the clue to the grounds for Rawls's belief that
inequalities can sometimes be justified as being in the best interests
of those least favoured by the regime allowing for inequality.
Society being a collaborative enterprise capable of securing for all
advantages which none could secure alone, division of functions
and division of labour increases the capacity of a society to confer
benefits on its members. The more it can be secured that people are
called to the functions which their native abilities best fit them to
perform (and fit them to perform best), the greater the general
advantage. But such advantages are not worth pursuing at the price
of great inequalities and the best equilibrium is when only such
inequalities are permitted as are either intrinsic to the performance
of a function (Prime Ministerial powers) or essential as incentives to
secure the attraction of individuals to those jobs which they are best
fitted to perform (high pay for the doctors might be an example), in
circumstances in which the performance of those tasks at all, and
their performance by the best qualified people, secures the greatest
possible benefits to those who benefit least from the overall
scheme.
26
How inegalitarian a society does this envisage? That seems to me
to depend essentially on questions of fact. In a society whose
members were imbued with a sense of justice and a common
acceptance of principles like Rawls's as defining the content of that
sense of justice, and in which a conscious effort was made to reduce
inequalities to such a point of equilibrium as that envisaged,
forward-looking only- see MacCormick, supra, note 12 at 405.
26. Barry (supra, note 10 at 51) refers to Rawls as favouring meritocracy; but
Rawls denies this, in my opinion with justification - see MacCormick, supra,
note 12 at 406-8.
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differentials, and especially differential incomes provided as
incentive payments, might well be quite small. Especially would
this be so if, as he claims, such a society would embody the idea of
fraternalism in a common sense that everybody's abilities were
being consciously used with a view to furthering the advantage of
all.
There are certainly formidable difficulties in calculating how to
apply the principle, as perhaps the last paragraph indicates; and Dr.
Barry has shown that powerful criticisms may be made of Rawls's
own suggestions about practical methods of applying it.27 But
subject to all such difficulties in trying to imagine its application, I
am bound to say that I find myself in substantial assent to the
proposition that we should so adjust our legal, economic and social
systems as to secure that they allow for no inequalities save those
which advance best the lot of those who enjoy the lower positions
on the existing scales of inequality. If in the end that should lead us
to discover their total eliminability, I should be none the sadder for
that.
As I said at the outset, human societies are not voluntary
associations, and can never be entirely so. I suggest to you for
consideration the view that if. they were developed along the lines
suggested by Rawls on the basis of this hypothetical social contract,
they would become more and more worthy of the consent of all their
members, and thus approximate more and more to being voluntary
associations. I do not say so with the certainty of absolute
conviction but I do think the proposition is worth considering.
27. Supra, note 10, c. 5. See at 50: "Surely not since Locke's theory of property
have such potentially radical premises been used as the foundation for something so
little disturbing to the status quo!" But the premises are certainly open to a more
radical reading, which is what I have given them here.
